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THE PARALLEL LAW OF
LAWYERING IN CIVIL LITIGATION
Andrew Perlman*
INTRODUCTION
Civil litigators are increasingly governed by a body of law that is similar,
but not identical, to existing rules of professional conduct. For example,
Rule 26(b)(5)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4.4(b) of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct both address a lawyer’s
obligations upon receiving an inadvertently disclosed privileged document.
Model Rule 4.4(b), however, only requires the receiving lawyer to notify
the sender of the mistake, 1 whereas the civil procedure rule imposes
additional obligations, including a duty to return the inadvertently disclosed
document. 2 Scholars, 3 as well as the Model Rules themselves, 4 recognize
that parallel law of the sort contained in Federal Rule 26(b)(5)(B) now
increasingly governs lawyers’ conduct.
This Article contends that the parallel law in the civil litigation context
does not merely supplement or complement rules of professional conduct; it
is increasingly in tension with the ethics rules, causing several problems.
First, this tension has created confusion for lawyers who seek to conform
their conduct to the relevant standard. For example, because courts do not
always disqualify lawyers who have a conflict of interest under the relevant
ethics rules or, conversely, do disqualify lawyers who have not violated the
applicable conflicts rules, 5 lawyers have trouble determining how to
proceed in the face of a possible conflict of interest. Second, because of
this type of confusion, the bar tends not to discipline lawyers for violations
of the rules of professional conduct when the parallel law differs in content
or application. Finally, these developments threaten to diminish the
* Professor, Suffolk University Law School. The author is grateful for the assistance of
research librarian Ellen Delaney as well as for helpful comments and suggestions from
Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Elizabeth Cohen, Bruce Green, David Hricik, Matt Lowe,
Ellyn Rosen, and John Steele.
1. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011).
2. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
3. See, e.g., John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959 (2009);
Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009).
4. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope [15] (The Scope section of the Model
Rules expressly acknowledges that other law regulates lawyer behavior, explaining that
“[t]he Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer’s role. That context
includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific
obligations of lawyers and substantive and procedural law in general.”).
5. See infra Part II.A.
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authority of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct by transforming
disciplinary rules into toothless provisions that lack enforceable law-like
status. This Article concludes that to address these problems, the Model
Rules must have more modest ambitions with regard to the regulation of
lawyers and should cede responsibility for regulating lawyer conduct when
a Model Rule does not serve as a basis for discipline and is in tension with
parallel authorities.
Part I of this Article examines three areas in which the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct are in tension with parallel law in the civil litigation
context: (1) conflicts of interests, (2) frivolous pleadings and discovery
contentions, and (3) the inadvertent disclosure of privileged information. In
each of these areas, courts frequently ignore the seemingly applicable ethics
rules and instead apply other law, such as rules of civil procedure or the
common law on disqualification.
Part II offers two reasons for this development. First, in some cases, the
development of a parallel rule of civil procedure has rendered the applicable
rule of professional conduct largely obsolete. For example, the adoption of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 (governing frivolous legal
contentions) 6 and 26(b)(5)(B) (regarding inadvertent disclosures) 7 have
made the parallel rules of professional conduct 8 effectively meaningless in
federal litigation and in state cases governed by analogous rules of civil
procedure. Second, in other areas, the competing parallel law has
developed because judges have refused to apply the relevant rules of
professional conduct as the governing standard. For example, many courts
have denied motions to disqualify despite the existence of a conflict of
interest under the applicable rules of professional conduct.9 Conversely,
courts have granted motions to disqualify even when a law firm has
complied with the plain language of the governing ethics rule.10
Part III examines ways in which the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct could be amended in response to these trends. One possibility is to
adopt the approach of the California Bar, which recently proposed a rule
that omits any reference to conflicts screening. 11 The California Bar
reasoned that the effectiveness of screens was an unsettled area of law and
was best left to the courts to resolve on a case-by-case basis. 12 This
proposal is intriguing—and potentially attractive—because it does not
create confusion about the relevant standard that lawyers should follow. In
6.
7.
8.
9.

FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
Id. 26(b)(5)(B).
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1, R. 4.4(b).
See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 74–78 (1996).
10. See, e.g., Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Reading Blue Mountain & N. R.R. Co., 397 F. Supp.
2d 551 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
11. See STATE BAR OF CALIF. COMM’N FOR THE REVISION OF THE RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT, PROPOSED RULE 1.10 IMPUTATION OF CONFLICTS: GENERAL RULE (April 2010),
available
at
http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=qKcQ8vAQg2E%
3d&tabid=2161.
12. Id. at 4.
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particular, it avoids a situation where lawyers are subject to one standard as
a matter of ethics and a competing standard as a matter of disqualification
law. The California approach also acknowledges that certain areas of
attorney regulation are more properly handled outside of the rules of
professional conduct. In the case of screening, for example, the approach
recognizes that other authorities (in this case, the courts) are in a better
position to determine whether a screen should be permitted to avoid the
imputation of a conflict in a particular case.13
Part IV locates this development in two broader contexts. First, recent
articles have examined the extent to which other law now governs attorney
behavior. 14 Whereas those articles have focused on the growth of this
parallel law more generally, this Article focuses on the civil litigation
context specifically and the tension between the ethics rules and the parallel
law in that context.
Second, this Article places the discussion in historical context and
contends that the ethics rules are not nearly as law-like as they once were or
have been imagined to be. In a widely-cited article from 1989, 15 Professor
Nancy J. Moore explained that the legal profession’s ethics codes have
undergone a fairly typical evolution from aspirational standards under the
Ethical Canons, to the mix of aspirational norms and law-like rules under
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, to their final law-like status
under the current Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 16 The growing
tension between parallel law and the applicable ethics rules, however, has
reversed this evolutionary process and caused a devolution of the Model
Rules from law-like status to the more complicated and lamentable mix of
rules and aspirational norms that too often lack disciplinary bite. To reverse
this trend, this Article contends that the profession needs to evolve once
more, but in a new and unexpected direction. It needs to develop a clearer
sense of which categories of lawyer conduct should be regulated by other
legal authorities (e.g., the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, case law) and
revise rules of professional conduct so that they are more consonant with
the achievement of law-like status. This goal may be accomplished by
deleting certain provisions, like the screening provision in Model Rule
1.10, 17 that are now governed by contrary parallel law and are not being
used as a basis for discipline.
I. THE INCREASING DISREGARD FOR THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT IN CIVIL LITIGATION
Three areas illustrate the development of civil litigation’s parallel law of
lawyering: (1) conflicts of interest and disqualification, (2) frivolous
pleadings and discovery contentions, and (3) inadvertently disclosed
privileged documents. In each of these contexts, litigators rely on legal
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See generally Green, supra note 9.
See, e.g., Leubsdorf, supra note 3; Zacharias, supra note 3.
Nancy J. Moore, The Usefulness of Ethical Codes, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 7, 15.
Id.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2011).
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authorities other than the applicable rules of professional conduct to
determine the propriety of their behavior.
A. Conflicts of Interest and Disqualification
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct describe whether a lawyer has
a conflict of interest. 18 Although these conflicts rules were originally
designed to provide a standard for disqualification,19 courts have developed
their own law on disqualification. This law often fails to track the conflicts
rules or expressly declines to consider disqualification to be an issue
governed by the relevant rules of professional conduct.20 The law on
disqualification, therefore, operates as a form of parallel authority that
resembles the law on conflicts, but differs from it in numerous material
respects.
Consider, for example, the recent and illustrative California decision in
Kirk v. First American Title Insurance Co. 21 The underlying case involved
several related class actions against the First American Title Insurance
Company (First American) and affiliated entities.22 During the litigation,
the plaintiffs’ lawyers contacted Gary Cohen, who was both the general
counsel of the California Department of Insurance and the chief counsel for
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, about the possibility of hiring him as
a litigation consultant.23 During a seventeen-minute telephone conversation
with Mr. Cohen, the plaintiffs’ lawyers disclosed confidential information,
including their theories of the case against First American. 24 After the
conversation, Mr. Cohen determined that the Fireman’s Fund might be
obligated to provide insurance coverage for a First American entity
involved in the case, so Mr. Cohen declined to be the plaintiffs’
consultant. 25
About one year later, Mr. Cohen joined the law firm of Sonnenschein
Nath & Rosenthal as a partner in the firm’s San Francisco office.26 Shortly
thereafter, the team of lawyers who represented First American in the class
action litigation for which Mr. Cohen had previously been consulted moved
to Sonnenschein’s St. Louis and Los Angeles offices. 27 Those lawyers did
18. Id. R. 1.7–1.12.
19. Green, supra note 9, at 77.
20. See id.; see also In re DataTreasury Corp., No. 2010-M928, 2010 WL 3074395, at
*1–2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 5, 2010); Hempstead Video, Inc. v. Inc. Vill. of Valley Stream, 409
F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2005); Silicon Graphics, Inc. v. ATI Techs., Inc., No. 06-cv-611-bbc, 2010
WL 3860374, at *11 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 5, 2010); Intelli-Check, Inc. v. Tricom Card Tech.,
Inc., No. 03 CV 3706 (DLI) (ETB), 2008 WL 4682433, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2008);
Kirk v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 620, 631–45 (Ct. App. 2010); Laprise v.
Paul, No. 5100775, 2007 WL 4636533, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2007); Milne v.
Ryea, No. CV010811597S, 2004 WL 423117, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2004).
21. 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 620.
22. Id. at 625.
23. Id. at 626.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 626–27.
26. Id. at 626.
27. Id. at 627.
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not know about Mr. Cohen’s previous conversations with plaintiffs’
counsel, 28 but shortly after Sonnenschein was substituted as counsel in the
case, the plaintiffs filed an objection to Sonnenschein’s representation of
First American, pointing out their prior conversation with Mr. Cohen. 29
Sonnenschien immediately erected a screen around Mr. Cohen, which
included a variety of procedures designed to prevent Mr. Cohen from
sharing any information about the matter with any lawyers or other
personnel at the firm. 30 The plaintiffs nevertheless sought to disqualify
Sonnenschein from the case because of Mr. Cohen’s presence in the firm. 31
The California trial court granted the motion.32 The court acknowledged
that in doing so, First American might have to spend millions of dollars to
educate new counsel about the long-pending and highly complex matter.33
Nevertheless, the court concluded that Mr. Cohen’s conflict of interest was
imputed to the rest of the law firm. 34
The California Court of Appeal reversed. 35 The court reasoned that
although the California Rules of Professional Conduct do not authorize
screens (and do not even address vicarious conflicts), 36 the law on
disqualification does not necessarily turn on what the California Rules of
Professional Conduct state or require. 37 The court thoroughly canvassed
the existing case law in California and elsewhere 38 before concluding that
firms should be permitted to employ screens to avoid the imputation of
certain types of conflicts of interest.39 The court then offered a variety of
policy arguments supporting this conclusion, 40 sketched out the
requirements of an effective screen, 41 and held that the screen employed in
this particular case satisfied those requirements and was sufficient to
prevent the firm’s disqualification. 42 In sum, the court held that the Rules
of Professional Conduct provide a basis for discipline, but the Rules do not
necessarily bind the court’s analysis of disqualification motions.43
Numerous other cases have reached a similar conclusion, even in

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 628–29.
32. Id. at 629.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 651.
36. Id. at 631.
37. Id. The court also examined the deliberations of the State Bar of California
Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. at 640–41. Although
the Commission ultimately did not endorse any view of screening, the court noted that a
majority of the Commission appeared to favor screening, at least in certain circumstances.
Id. at 641.
38. Id. at 631–40.
39. Id. at 638.
40. Id. at 643–45.
41. Id. at 645–49.
42. See id. at 649.
43. Id. at 631.
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jurisdictions that have a clear rule on the imputation of conflicts and that do
not authorize a screen to avoid imputation.44
Several cases stand for the converse proposition: disqualification of a
law firm is proper despite the firm’s compliance with all of the relevant
rules of professional conduct. 45 For example, in Norfolk Southern Railway
Co. v. Reading Blue Mountain & Northern Railroad Co., 46 the District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania disqualified a law firm that
had complied with the screening procedures identified in Pennsylvania Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.10. 47 The court explained that it disqualified the
firm in light of several additional factors that do not appear in the Rule,
including: “1. [t]he substantiality of the relationship between the attorney
and the former client[;] 2. the time lapse between the matters in dispute[;] 3.
the size of the firm and the number of disqualified attorneys[;] 4. the nature
of the disqualified attorney’s involvement[;] [and] 5. the timing of the
wall.” 48
The court applied these factors and concluded that insufficient time had
elapsed between the laterally-hired lawyer’s representation of his former
client and his arrival at the new firm. 49 Moreover, the court noted that the
laterally-hired lawyer had a substantial relationship with his former client
and that he worked directly on the very matter pending in his new firm.50
Finally, the court explained that the law firm at issue was relatively small
(ten attorneys in the office in question), which made a screen more
problematic. 51 Although Pennsylvania’s Rule 1.10 52 does not mention any
of these factors, the court nevertheless granted the motion to disqualify
based on an application of those factors to the case.53
Cases like Norfolk Southern are less common than cases like Kirk, but
the disproportionately small number of cases like Norfolk Southern is
probably due to the relatively small number of states that permit the kind of
broad screening that exists in Pennsylvania. 54 For this reason, cases like
Norfolk Southern are likely to increase as the trend towards more expansive
screening provisions accelerates. Indeed, Model Rule 1.10’s newly adopted
Comment [7] clearly anticipates this very development, warning lawyers
44. See Green, supra note 9, at 74–78 (discussing cases).
45. See, e.g., Burgess-Lester v. Ford Motor Co., 643 F. Supp. 2d 811, 815–16 (N.D. W.
Va. 2008); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Reading Blue Mountain & N. R.R. Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d
551, 553–57 (M.D. Pa. 2005); Crudele v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, No. 97 Civ. 6687 (RCC),
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13779 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2001); James v. Teleflex, Inc., No. CIV. A.
97–1206, 1999 WL 98559, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb.24, 1999).
46. 397 F. Supp. 2d 551.
47. PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2008); Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d
at 554.
48. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d at 554.
49. Id. at 554–55.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 555.
52. PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10.
53. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d at 555–57.
54. STEPHEN GILLERS, ROY D. SIMON & ANDREW M. PERLMAN, REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 149–52 (2011 ed.).
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that they “should be aware . . . that, even where screening mechanisms have
been adopted, tribunals may consider additional factors in ruling upon
motions to disqualify a lawyer from pending litigation.” 55
Although Kirk and Norfolk Southern are both screening cases, it is
important to remember that there are a considerable number of conflicts
cases outside of the screening context where courts have reached a
disqualification decision that is at odds with the relevant ethics rules. 56 All
of these cases illustrate that the law on disqualification does not necessarily
turn on whether there is a conflict of interest under the rules of professional
conduct. Rather, parallel law increasingly governs the area. In fact, some
scholars have argued that parallel law—the law on disqualification—should
govern this area given that the courts (not the rules) are best equipped to
determine when disqualification is appropriate.57
This development would not be especially problematic if the conflicts
rules served the function that courts and lawyers typically assume they
have: offering a basis for discipline.58 In reality, however, a law firm’s use
of an unauthorized screen by itself is almost never the basis for discipline.59
These two trends—the development of a separate body of disqualification
law and the rarity of discipline for violations of the conflicts rules alone—
suggest that the rule has become less law-like and no longer supplies
lawyers with adequate guidance regarding their conduct. 60
B. Frivolous Pleadings, Delaying Litigation, and Improper Discovery
Behavior
The diminution of the Model Rules’ law-like status is further evidenced
by the near-obsolescence of Model Rules 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4(d), which govern
frivolous pleadings, litigation-delaying tactics, and discovery misconduct,
respectively. 61 Despite the pervasive role that pleadings and discovery play
in litigators’ lives, litigators and judges rarely need to refer to these rules.
The reason is simple: Rules 11 and 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil

55. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10 cmt. [7] (2011).
56. See generally Green, supra note 9, at 77–78 (noting criminal cases and discussing
how rules are often ignored).
57. Id. at 99 (arguing “the conflict rules should not serve as the appropriate standard for
deciding disqualification motions”); id. at 110–11.
58. Kirk v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 620, 631 (Ct. App. 2010)
(explaining that “[g]enerally speaking, the Rules of Professional Conduct govern attorney
discipline; they do not create standards for disqualification in the courts”).
59. Of course, discipline is warranted when lawyers have breached a screen and shared
confidential information, but there are separate ethics provisions, such as Rule 1.6, that deal
with that issue and which can serve as a basis for discipline. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6. There is rarely, if ever, discipline for the mere deployment of a screen in
the lateral attorney context, even when such a screen is found not to be authorized by the
relevant conflicts rule.
60. The conflicts rules are frequently cited as a basis for legal malpractice. But here
again, the rules are not supposed to set a standard for malpractice, and so the rules do not
have law-like status in this context either. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope [20].
61. Id. R. 3.1, 3.2, 3.4(d).
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Procedure 62 (or their state equivalents) as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (in
federal cases) 63 establish the relevant standards in these areas. Lawyers and
judges look to these authorities for guidance rather than to the relevant rules
of professional conduct. The point is similar to the previously discussed
split between disqualification law and the conflicts rules: the relevant rules
of professional conduct have been largely supplanted by other authority. In
this case, the supplanting, parallel authority is the rules of civil procedure
and related statutes.
It is surprising that the Model Rules fail to acknowledge this
development. For example, Model Rule 3.1 governs frivolous pleadings,
and Comment [3] observes that a “lawyer’s obligations under this Rule are
subordinate to federal or state constitutional law that entitles a defendant in
a criminal matter to the assistance of counsel in presenting a claim or
contention that otherwise would be prohibited by this Rule.”64 Notably
absent from the Comment is any recognition (such as exists in Rule 1.1065)
that a lawyer’s obligation may be different under the federal or state rules of
civil procedure or other applicable statutory law.
The failure to
acknowledge that law other than constitutional law governs this area is a
surprising omission given the widespread understanding that other law,
such as rules of civil procedure, has effectively taken over this area of
regulation.
Like Model Rule 3.1, Model Rule 3.4(d) fails to acknowledge that most
jurisdictions have rules of civil procedure that govern precisely the same
topic. Model Rule 3.4(d) states that a lawyer shall not, “in pretrial
procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably
diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an
opposing party.” 66 But Rules 26(g)(3) and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (and their state equivalents) already provide for sanctions under
these circumstances. 67
Model Rule 3.2 raises similar issues. It states that “[a] lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the
client.” 68 In federal court, judges have no need to refer to Model Rule 3.2,
because a statute governs this area.69 It provides that “[a]ny attorney . . .
who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously
may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs,
expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct.” 70 And in state courts that have no statutory provision similar to
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 26.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006); see infra text accompanying note 70.
64. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. [3].
65. Compare id., with id. R. 1.10 cmt. [7].
66. Id. R. 3.4.
67. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(3), 37; see GILLERS, SIMON & PERLMAN, supra note 54, at 264
(explaining “[v]arious provisions of the rules of procedure penalize the kinds of behavior
condemned in Rule 3.4”).
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.2.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006).
70. Id.
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28 U.S.C. § 1927, the behavior described in the Model Rule is tacitly
accepted by lawyers and the courts. Indeed, a comment to the Model Rule
explicitly acknowledges that the bench and bar often condone this
behavior. 71 That concession raises a question that cuts across Model Rules
3.1, 3.2, and 3.4(d): if the civil procedure rules and related statutes regulate
the conduct in these areas and if any other conduct covered by these Rules
is condoned, what purpose do these Model Rules serve?
There are two plausible answers. One possibility is that these Model
Rules supply a form of aspirational guidance that is not intended to be
enforced. This view, however, is inconsistent with the widespread
understanding of the Model Rules as black letter, enforceable norms of
conduct. 72 Moreover, such a view would make redundant various efforts to
draft professionalism codes that are supposed to supply unenforceable
standards of conduct. 73 Finally, the very idea of professionalism codes is
controversial, 74 and it would be made even more so if it is done
surreptitiously under the cover of the Model Rules.
A second and more plausible answer is that these Rules are supposed to
be used for attorney discipline, not court-imposed sanctions. But as is the
case in the conflicts context, there is little evidence that lawyers are actually
disciplined for violating these provisions in the absence of a corresponding
violation of the civil procedure rules. Moreover, it is not clear why separate
rules of professional conduct should even be necessary to discipline lawyers
who run afoul of—and are sanctioned for—violations of the rules of civil
procedure or related statutes. After all, Model Rule 3.4(c) already provides
that a lawyer shall not “knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of
a tribunal.” 75 Thus, Model Rule 3.4(c) supplies an adequate basis for
discipline. Finally, the existence of parallel authority can generate
confusion about the relevant standard or, worse, lead lawyers to conclude
that they can ignore the rules of professional conduct without consequence.
For all of these reasons, the Model Rules in these areas do not appear to
serve any useful purpose; if anything, they generate confusion and
undermine the law-like status of the Model Rules as a whole.
C. Inadvertent Disclosures
A third area where the ethics rules have diverged from the law governing
lawyers in civil litigation is in the context of inadvertently disclosed
privileged documents. Until recently, the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct did not instruct lawyers how to respond to the receipt of such

71. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.2 cmt. [1].
72. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 15, at 7–11.
73. See Professionalism Codes, A.B.A., http://www.abanet.org/cpr/professionalism/
profcodes.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2011) (listing state professionalism codes).
74. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade,
74 TEX. L. REV. 259 (1995).
75. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(c).
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information. 76 Instead, an American Bar Association (ABA) ethics opinion
advised lawyers to refrain from examining inadvertently disclosed
documents, to notify the sender of the error, and to comply with the
sender’s instructions—which usually required returning the document to the
sender. 77 Many states produced ethics opinions that reached the same
conclusion. 78
In 2002, the ABA added a new Model Rule, Rule 4.4(b), which elevates
the law in this area to Model Rule status. 79 The substance of the guidance,
however, differs from the earlier ABA opinion. Instead of requiring
lawyers to return the inadvertently sent documents upon request, the new
Model Rule simply imposes a duty to notify the sending attorney of the
mistake. It provides that “[a] lawyer who receives a document relating to
the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should
know that the document was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the
sender.” 80
In 2006, shortly after the adoption of Model Rule 4.4(b), Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended. 81 Rule 26(b)(5)(B) now
provides as follows:
(B) Information Produced. If information produced in discovery is
subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as trial preparation
material, the party making the claim may notify any party that received
the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a
party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified
information and any copies it has; must not use or disclose the
information until the claim is resolved; must take reasonable steps to
retrieve the information if the party disclosed it before being notified; and
may promptly present the information to the court under seal for a
determination of the claim. The producing party must preserve the
information until the claim is resolved. 82

As a result of this amendment, a lawyer’s refusal to return an
inadvertently disclosed privileged document would be permissible under
Model Rule 4.4(b) but would violate Federal Rule 26(b)(5)(B). Thus, this
is yet another area where litigators have to comply with legal authority
parallel to, but nevertheless distinct from, the applicable rule of professional
conduct, at least in federal cases and in states that have adopted analogous
provisions. 83

76. See Andrew M. Perlman, Untangling Ethics Theory from Attorney Conduct Rules:
The Case of Inadvertent Disclosures, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 767, 781 (2005).
77. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992).
78. Perlman, supra note 76, at 783–85.
79. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b).
80. Id.
81. Obviously, to the extent that states adopt this provision in their rules of civil
procedure, the ethics rule would be supplanted in state court litigation as well. See, e.g., FLA.
R. CIV. P. 1.285 (2011).
82. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B) (emphasis added).
83. See, e.g., FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.285.
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As in the case of conflicts screening, a comment after the new Model
Rule anticipates the existence of this sort of parallel authority. Comment
[2] states that “[w]hether the lawyer is required to take additional steps
[upon receiving an inadvertently disclosed document], such as returning the
original document, is a matter of law beyond the scope of these Rules.”84
Comment [2] is simultaneously perplexing and useful. The Comment is
perplexing because it is not clear why this particular Model Rule
acknowledges other authority while other Model Rules that regularly coexist with parallel law (such as Model Rule 3.1’s provision on frivolous
pleadings) do not. The Comment, however, is useful because it anticipates
the very problem that this Article is highlighting: other law may supplant
the Model Rules and the Model Rules should be revised to reflect this
reality. Although the details of how a particular Model Rule should address
these realities will differ, 85 acknowledging civil litigation’s parallel law of
lawyering in Model Rule 4.4(b) is a relatively recent, but useful, step in the
right direction.
II. EXPLAINING THE RIFT BETWEEN THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULES
AND THE APPLICABLE STANDARDS IN CIVIL LITIGATION
Before examining how the Model Rules should be revised in light of the
existence of parallel law, it is important to understand why the parallel law
exists in the first place. There are at least two distinct and conflicting
reasons for the development.
First, some rules have become the victims of their own success. For
example, the standards contained in Model Rules 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4(d) are so
well-established that they have been codified elsewhere, such as in the rules
of civil procedure or in statutes.86 As a result of this codification, there are
now parallel sources of authority for precisely the same conduct.
In contrast, other parallel law has developed because of disagreements
concerning the applicable ethics rules. For example, the law on
disqualification has parted ways from the black letter law governing
conflicts of interest 87 because courts have concluded that the conflicts rules
do not reflect the right balance of policy interests for disqualification
purposes. This development is particularly interesting given that the
conflicts rules were originally intended to serve as a standard for
disqualification.88 Comment [7] to Model Rule 1.10, which was revised in
2009, now reflects this divergence, providing that “[l]awyers should be
aware . . . that, even where screening mechanisms have been adopted,
tribunals may consider additional factors in ruling upon motions to
disqualify a lawyer from pending litigation.” 89 In sum, this split reflects
substantive disagreement over the appropriate standard to be applied.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) cmt. [2].
See infra Part III.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006); FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 26(b)(5)(B).
See supra Part II.A.
Green, supra note 9, at 77.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10 cmt. [7] (2011).
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III. BRIDGING THE DIVIDE BY LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
The parallel law governing lawyers in the civil litigation context has
developed for different reasons, and any proposed change to the Model
Rules needs to account for these differences. When the applicable parallel
law is in tension with the Model Rules because of a substantive
disagreement and the Model Rule does not serve any disciplinary function,
the Model Rule should be deleted. In those circumstances, lawyers should
simply be instructed to consult with the other law that governs the subject.
The proposal below regarding the screening provision in Rule 1.10
illustrates this approach.
In other cases, where the parallel law does not necessarily conflict with a
Model Rule and is merely a codification of the Model Rule’s basic
approach, the scope of the Model Rule may simply need to be clarified. For
example, the divergence between the civil procedure rules on frivolous
pleadings and Model Rule 3.1’s treatment of the same topic is less
problematic than the discrepancy between Model Rule 1.10’s screening
provision and the law on disqualification, because Model Rule 3.1 and the
relevant civil procedure rules do not conflict. In this sort of situation, the
solution may simply be to update the Model Rule so that it accurately
reflects the existing legal authority.
A. Eliminating the Conflicts Screening Provision in Rule 1.10
The subject of screening has generated considerable commentary, with
scholars and lawyers closely divided as to its merits. 90 Those who believe
that screening should be permissible argue that Rule 1.10 should authorize
screening, 91 while those who oppose screening argue against such a
provision. 92 The parallel law on disqualification suggests the conventional
debate overlooks a third possible approach: eliminate the screening
provision from the rule and encourage courts to continue developing
disqualification law in this area.
This approach would prevent some existing sources of confusion. At
present, lawyers can comply with the screening provision in Rule 1.10, yet
be disqualified. Conversely, lawyers can fail to comply with the screening
provision in Rule 1.10, yet avoid disqualification. The latter scenario is
especially troubling because it not only causes confusion, but it tends to
undermine the legal authority of the rules of professional conduct. In

90. For an overview of the contentious legislative history of Rule 1.10, see GILLERS,
SIMON & PERLMAN, supra note 54, at 145–49.
91. See A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF. RESP., SECTION OF LITIG.,
STANDING COMM. ON PROFESSIONALISM, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES:
RECOMMENDATION 2,
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/cpr/pic/report109rule.authcheckdam.pdf (compiling statements in support of and
proposing the addition of a screening provision to Model Rule 1.10).
92. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS
§ 10.20 (3d ed. 2004).
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particular, it gives lawyers the impression that their failure to comply with
the ethics rule has no consequences.93
Choice of law considerations create a separate and additional source of
confusion. Imagine that a law firm hires a lawyer, Lawyer A, in a state that
permits screening. Lawyer A’s presence in the firm creates a conflict for
another of the firm’s lawyers, Lawyer B, who is located in a state that does
not permit screening. And now, imagine that Lawyer B’s conflict has
arisen in a case that Lawyer B is litigating in yet another state, which may
or may not permit screening. Can the law firm ethically employ a screen
around Lawyer A to prevent Lawyer B’s disqualification? Model Rule
8.5(b) addresses a variety of choice of law issues, 94 but many questions of
this sort remain unanswered and cause considerable confusion when law
firms try to comply with their ethical obligations.95
All of this confusion might be acceptable if the screening provision in the
current version of Rule 1.10 served a purpose other than supplying the
governing standard for disqualification, such as providing a basis for
discipline. No lawyer or law firm, however, has ever been disciplined for
the mere fact of erecting a screen. Of course, lawyers are disciplined for
violating a screen (e.g., sharing confidential information), but there are
separate rules of professional conduct, such as Rule 1.6, that forbid such
conduct and serve as a basis for discipline.96 Put simply, the screening
provision in Model Rule 1.10 has caused confusion regarding the applicable
disqualification standard even in the absence of any choice of law
complications, and the screening provision does not appear to serve any
other useful function.
For these reasons, there is a powerful argument to be made in favor of the
California Bar’s recent proposal to delete the screening provision in Model
Rule 1.10 and to replace it with a comment that delegates the issue of
screening to the courts to resolve. To the extent that states might want to
offer any ethical guidance, they could explain how clients and former
clients should be notified in the event that a law firm erects a screen, such
as the procedures described in the current version of Model Rule

93. See Green, supra note 9, at 96–97. Professor Bruce A. Green argues that, if a court
finds a conflict but nevertheless denies a disqualification motion, the court should impose a
personal sanction against the lawyer. Id. Professor Green contends that the personal sanction
will ensure that a lawyer does not misconstrue the disqualification decision as a tacit
endorsement of the lawyer’s decision to proceed in light of the conflict. Id. at 96. Another
way to handle the same problem, at least in the screening context, is to make clear that
screening of the sort described in Model Rule 1.10(a) is not a matter of ethics at all and is to
be left to the courts to resolve.
94. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b).
95. For this reason, in 2009, the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Commission on
Ethics 20/20 created a Working Group on Uniformity, Choice of Law, and Conflicts of
Interest to try to resolve this common source of confusion. See generally ABA COMM’N ON
ETHICS
20/20,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/aba_
commission_on_ethics_20_20.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2011).
96. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6.
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1.10(a)(2)(i)–(iii). 97 These revisions could take the following form (the
italicized portions are proposed; deleted portions are crossed out):
Rule 1.10 Imputation of Conflicts of Interest: General Rule
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall
knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone
would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9, unless (1) the
prohibition is based upon a personal interest of the disqualified lawyer
and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the
representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm.; or
(2b) If the prohibition is based upon Rule 1.9(a) or (b) and arises out of
the disqualified lawyer’s association with a prior firm, a firm can erect a
screen around the disqualified lawyer. Whether this screen will be
effective to avoid the firm’s disqualification or other court sanction is a
matter beyond the scope of these Rules. If a firm erects a screen,
however, it shall ensure that:
(i1) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any
participation in the matter, and is apportioned no part of the fee
therefrom;
(ii2) written notice is promptly given to any affected former client
to enable the former client to ascertain compliance with the
provisions of this Rule, which shall include a description of the
screening procedures employed; a statement of the firm’s and of
the screened lawyer’s compliance with these Rules; a statement
that review may be available before a tribunal; and an agreement
by the firm to respond promptly to any written inquiries or
objections by the former client about the screening procedures;
and
(iii3) certifications of compliance with these Rules and with the
screening procedures are provided to the former client by the
screened lawyer and by a partner of the firm, at reasonable
intervals upon the former client’s written request and upon
termination of the screening procedures.

Moreover, a new Comment [7] could replace existing Comment [7]
as follows:
[7] Courts often examine many factors when deciding whether a screen
suffices to prevent a law firm’s disqualification under the circumstances
described in paragraph (b). Those factors include the likelihood that the
screen will be effective and the type of information that the disqualified
lawyer acquired. Because of the fact-bound nature of this inquiry and
because the relevant factors are generally ill-suited to black letter
treatment, paragraph (b) does not describe the disqualification standard
that should apply in this context. Rather, lawyers should consult the
substantial case law on this issue. Although paragraph (b) does not
supply the disqualification standard, law firms that erect a screen must
employ a screen in the manner prescribed by Rule 1.10(b)(1)–(3).

97. Id. R. 1.10(a)(2)(i)–(iii).
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Although the current version of Comment [7] alludes to the discrepancy
between the Model Rule and the law on disqualification,98 the proposed
version makes the point more clearly and elevates the point from a
Comment to the Model Rule itself, making confusion less likely. (It is
worth noting that only approximately one-third of states have adopted the
Comments, 99 so this relocation is not simply a matter of giving the point
greater prominence. In some states, it would make the point visible when it
otherwise would not be.) Moreover, the proposed approach eliminates any
possible implication or inference that the Model Rule supplies (or should
supply) 100 the relevant disqualification standard or that screening could be
the basis for bar discipline when, in fact, that is not the case.
B. Amending Model Rules 3.1 and 3.4(d)
In cases without a clear conflict between the parallel law and the Model
Rule or where the Model Rule serves some independent disciplinary
function, more modest amendments may be desirable. Consider Model
Rules 3.1 and 3.4(d). If these Model Rules are intended to supply a mirror
image of the civil procedure rules that govern frivolous pleadings 101 and
frivolous discovery requests and objections, 102 they are unnecessary. Rule
3.4(c) provides that a lawyer shall not “knowingly disobey an obligation
under the rules of a tribunal,” 103 so Rule 3.4(c) already gives bar counsel
adequate grounds for seeking discipline against lawyers who run afoul of
the rules of civil procedure concerning pleadings and discovery. 104 That
said, if the obligations imposed by Model Rules 3.1 and 3.4(d) merely
complement the extant law, there is no harm in leaving them intact, because
they can serve as a reminder that discipline is possible in this context.
To the extent these Model Rules are intended to impose greater
obligations than the civil procedure rules, however, they are more
problematic. For example, it is not at all clear why a lawyer should be
subject to discipline under Model Rule 3.1 if the lawyer complies with all
relevant rules of civil procedure regarding frivolous pleadings. Such a
discrepancy could create considerable confusion of the sort described above
in the context of the screening provision in Rule 1.10: a lawyer might
comply with the relevant law, yet still be disciplined. In sum, if Model
98. Id. R. 1.10 cmt. [7].
99. GILLERS, SIMON & PERLMAN, supra note 54, at 3.
100. Green, supra note 9, at 99 (making a similar point and arguing the conflict rules
should not supply the standard for resolving disqualification motions).
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
102. Id. 26(g)(3), 37.
103. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(C).
104. In 1999, the ABA approved Civil Discovery Standards to help courts and lawyers
deal with discovery issues that frequently occur in civil litigation but often fall outside the
scope of the statutes and court rules governing civil discovery. The Standards, which were
developed by the ABA Section of Litigation and were updated in 2004, relate to ABA Model
Rule 3.4(d). See A.B.A., AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS (August 2004),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/litigation/standards/
docs/103b_standards.authcheckdam.pdf. Thus, to the extent that lawyers need guidance
beyond what the existing civil procedure rules supply, that guidance already exists.

1980

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

Rules 3.1 and 3.4(d) are merely redundant, their continued existence is not
problematic, though their utility is questionable. If, however, Model Rules
3.1 and 3.4(d) supply a basis for discipline in circumstances that do not
violate the relevant civil procedure rules, any benefit from such
supplemental regulation may be outweighed by the confusion such a
discrepancy may cause. In that case, these Model Rules provisions also
may be good candidates for deletion.
C. A Model for the Future: Model Rule 4.4(b)
Model Rule 4.4 comes closest to dealing appropriately with the sort of
problem identified in this Article. Although Model Rule 4.4(b) only
requires the recipient of an inadvertent disclosure to notify the sending
attorney of the error, Comment [2] states that “[w]hether the lawyer is
required to take additional steps [upon receiving an inadvertently disclosed
document], such as returning the original document, is a matter of law
beyond the scope of these Rules.” 105 The Comment recognizes that there is
ample and growing parallel law in this area and that lawyers need to consult
that legal authority in order to determine the extent of their obligations.
In this sense, Comment [2] takes the same approach as Comment [7] to
Model Rule 1.10—both acknowledge that parallel law exists. There are,
however, two important distinctions that make Model Rule 4.4(b)’s
approach more appropriate than the seemingly similar approach in Model
Rule 1.10. First, not every jurisdiction has parallel law on how a lawyer
should respond to the receipt of inadvertently disclosed information.106 A
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure imposes additional requirements beyond
Model Rule 4.4(b), 107 but few other state civil procedure rules currently do
the same. As a result, lawyers in most states still need guidance about how
to proceed, and Model Rule 4.4(b) provides that needed guidance by
instructing them that they must notify the sender. In contrast, lawyers who
seek guidance about the effectiveness of screens can refer to an ample body
of case law that will provide a clearer indication of the likelihood of
disqualification than the rules of professional conduct. Thus, the screening
provision causes greater confusion and potential tension with the existing
law than is the case with Model Rule 4.4(b).
Second, no jurisdiction or court has concluded that a lawyer is free not to
notify the sender of an inadvertent disclosure. Thus, Rule 4.4(b)’s
prescription to notify does not conflict with any existing parallel law on the
subject. In contrast, many courts have rejected screening, so Rule 1.10’s
screening provision is in tension with the parallel law in this area. Put
another way, a lawyer’s compliance with Rule 4.4(b) will not generate
problems as long as the lawyer looks to other law (as the Comment
105. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) cmt. [2]. The point is that the wording
of Model Rules 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4 suggests that those rules are supposed to govern the conduct
of litigators when, in fact, litigators are governed in these areas by other authority (in this
case, the relevant rules of civil procedure).
106. Perlman, supra note 76, at 783–84.
107. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
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instructs) to ensure that the lawyer has no additional obligations. In
contrast, a law firm can comply with the screening provision in Rule 1.10
and nevertheless be disqualified. 108 Rule 1.10 and its existing Comment,
therefore, do more harm than Rule 4.4(b), even though parallel law exists
with regard to both Rules.
In sum, because the duty to notify under Rule 4.4(b) does not conflict
with any existing parallel law, the Rule need not be deleted; it appropriately
reminds lawyers to consult with other law to determine if any additional
obligations exist. 109
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT AND THEORIES OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION
In 1989, Professor Moore offered a helpful and widely cited description
of how the legal ethics rules have evolved:
Viewed in stages of development, the legal profession has attained a very
advanced stage among professions. Indeed, codes themselves have been
distinguished according to their stage of development. Typically, they
begin as a simple set of ideals to which adherents aspire, then move to a
“second-level” code, which contains more stringent language and is
designed to be enforced, and finally advance to a “third-level,” in which
the standards for proper practice are so clearly laid out that “[w]hat is left
is little more than a quasi-criminal code enforced by a professional society
rather than a constitutional government.” With the adoption and
enactment of the Model Rules, the legal profession may be the first to
achieve a true “third-level” code. (Indeed, given their unique legal status,
the Model Rules might be fairly characterized as initiating a new “fourthlevel” status, perhaps unattainable by any other professional code.) 110

This passage suggests that, although many rules are only enforced in
“egregious cases,” 111 the Model Rules have a law-like character.
The increasing prevalence of parallel law in the civil litigation realm
suggests the Model Rules may not be as law-like as they once were or have
been imagined to be. They may no longer constitute a third (or fourth) level
ethics code and may function more like a “second-level” ethics code,
containing a mix of disciplinary rules and aspirational norms.
One normative question is whether this development is problematic.
After all, the Model Rules have long had aspirational provisions that were
not likely to be enforced, and there is nothing wrong with giving lawyers
108. This can happen not only to lawyers practicing in states like Pennsylvania, where
courts employ additional factors beyond the screening rule, but also to lawyers who comply
with their own state’s version of Rule 1.10 only to find themselves litigating in another state
that does not permit screening.
109. The same reasoning applies to Model Rule 3.2’s provision regarding the expediting
of litigation. To the extent states have not adopted the equivalent of 28 U.S.C. § 1927,
Model Rule 3.2 can be helpful and may be worth retaining, though the existence of other law
should be more clearly stated in the Rule’s comments.
110. Moore, supra note 15, at 15 (quoting L.B. Cebik, Ethical Trilemmas, in 1 ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN ENGINEERING 17, 18 (Albert Flores ed., 2d ed. 1980)).
111. Id. at 16.
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guidance, even though the provisions are only enforced in egregious cases.
Indeed, the Model Rules themselves anticipate that they will be used, at
least in part, to provide “a just basis for a lawyer’s self-assessment.” 112
Moreover, the Model Rules always have anticipated that other substantive
law governs lawyer behavior. 113
The problem is that the percentage of rules that are aspirational or merely
for “self-assessment” appears to be increasing. Moreover, and more
importantly, the problem extends beyond non-enforcement or the existence
of parallel sources of authority. The problem now is that parallel law
increasingly conflicts with rules of professional conduct. Put another way,
the profession has seen the confluence of three forces—two pre-existing
and one relatively new—that are undermining the law-like status of rules of
professional conduct. The two pre-existing forces are that the ethics rules
are only enforced in egregious cases and that there is substantial substantive
law outside of the ethics rules governing lawyer behavior. These two forces
by themselves are not necessarily problematic. The problem is the addition
of the new force: the development of parallel law that is in tension with,
and in some instances directly contradicts, the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. Together, these three forces have created confusion and are
undermining the law-like status of the Model Rules.
Recent scholarship has identified some of these forces and called for the
profession to more openly acknowledge the existence of parallel
authorities. 114 For example, in one of his last published articles, Professor
Fred C. Zacharias argued that the profession has bought into a “myth of
self-regulation” and that a significant body of other law now governs
lawyer behavior. 115 Other scholars have examined the important and
related question of who should regulate lawyers’ conduct in light of the
existence of numerous institutional actors in this area. 116 For instance, in
an important article published in 1992, Professor David B. Wilkins
developed a framework for determining which institutional actors should
regulate particular areas of lawyer conduct. 117
This Article makes two supplemental points. First, it highlights the third
force—the extent to which the different sources of law are in tension with
each other. In other words, it is important to acknowledge the existence of
overlapping law and the presence of different institutional actors, but it is
also important to document the extent to which this overlapping law is in
tension with rules of professional conduct. 118
112. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope [20].
113. Id. at [15].
114. Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 959–62; Zacharias, supra note 3, at 1148–51.
115. See generally Zacharias, supra note 3.
116. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Legal Process Scholarship and the Regulation of Lawyers,
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (1996).
117. See generally David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV.
799, 822–46 (1992).
118. Professor Green notes this tension, Green, supra note 9, at 112, but he quickly
(perhaps too quickly) dismisses it by saying that the Rules are simply different from
disqualification and that the existence of other law does not diminish the Rules’ importance.
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Second, this Article starts from the premise that, as a practical matter, the
decision concerning who should regulate a particular type of lawyer
conduct is often not an affirmative choice. The decision is typically made
by other institutional actors, such as courts, and rule drafters must
determine how to respond to that reality. For example, courts have decided
that they will not be bound by rules of professional conduct when
determining whether a screen should defeat a disqualification motion. The
question, therefore, is not who should regulate this area; the question is how
rulemakers should respond to the courts’ development of authority that is at
odds with the rules. This Article suggests that rulemakers should accept
that rules of professional conduct will not supply the disqualification
standard in certain instances, such as in the screening context, and that the
relevant rules of professional conduct should be revised to reflect this
reality, especially when the rules are not serving some other useful function,
such as supplying a basis for discipline or giving lawyers helpful guidance.
Of course, this approach does not necessarily resolve the conceptual
question of who should regulate this conduct. For example, one might
argue that courts should apply rules of professional conduct when making
disqualification decisions and should not develop their own law in this area.
The extant literature addresses this question in detail, and the present article
is not intended to duplicate it. Rather, it addresses the more practical
question of how an institutional actor, such as the ABA, should react given
that other institutional actors have asserted their authority in certain areas.
The answer suggested here is that the Model Rules should be revised in the
ways described in Part III in order to ensure that they more accurately
reflect the development of parallel law and to prevent the further erosion of
their law-like status.
CONCLUSION
The conventional wisdom is that the legal profession’s code of ethics has
evolved from a set of aspirational provisions into a legal document capable
of enforcement through a variety of regulatory mechanisms. 119 Civil
litigation’s parallel law governing lawyers, however, suggests that the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct are increasingly in tension with other
law. As a result, many Model Rules have lost their law-like status and are
either being ignored or causing confusion about the applicable governing
standard.
For these reasons, the Model Rules need to evolve yet again. The Model
Rules must reflect the increasing relevance of other law, such as the parallel
He cites the Preamble to the Model Rules, including this very distinction between
disqualification and conflict rules that is mentioned there. Id. & n.157 (citing MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble). The Preamble, however, assumes that the Rules serve some
purpose, such as “self-assessment,” or are being enforced, at least in egregious cases. See
generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble. The reality, however, is that some
rules, such as the screening provision, are not serving these alternative possible purposes and
are thus causing confusion in light of the tension with the existing “parallel” law.
119. Moore, supra note 15, at 15.
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law of lawyering in the civil litigation context and accept a more modest
role in regulating lawyer behavior. The recent revisions to Comment [7] to
Model Rule 1.10 and to Comment [2] to Model Rule 4.4 reflect one useful
step in that direction, because they both recognize that other law now
governs important questions previously resolved under the ethics rules.
Nevertheless, Rule 1.10’s Comment does not go far enough because of the
extent to which the screening provision is in tension with existing law. A
more aggressive, and arguably more appropriate, approach is to omit ethics
provisions that are not enforced as a matter of discipline, are in conflict with
other sources of law, and are causing confusion about the applicable
governing standards. Such an approach would not only help to avoid
creating confusion about the applicable standards that apply in civil
litigation, but would also help to protect the law-like status of the Model
Rules and preserve at least some of the Bar’s role in regulating lawyer
conduct.

